National Transportation Safety Board has issued Marine Accident Brief in order to inform on the collision between US Coast Guard cutter Key Largo and fishing vessel Sea Shepherd, with subsequent sinking of Sea Shepherd.The investigation determined that the probable cause of the collision was fatigue.
The incident
On September 23, 2014, about 0635, the 110-foot-long US Coast Guard cutter Key Largo collided with the 42-foot-long fishing vessel Sea Shepherd in the Virgin Passage, about 9 miles east-northeast of Vieques Island, Puerto Rico. Just before the collision, the two Sea Shepherd crewmembers, who were hauling lobster traps on board, jumped in the water. No one was injured. The Key Largo sustained minor damage. The Sea Shepherd sank about 2 hours after the collision.
Although the NTSB was unable to positively determine that the OOD fell asleep while on watch before the collision, the evidence indicates that it is likely. The accident occurred shortly after his circadian low (a time when people are most likely to be fatigued); he had only 3.5 hours of sleep in the preceding 24 hours; and he was seated alone on the navigation bridge.
Further, there was no alteration in the vessel’s course or speed, nor was there radio communication with the Sea Shepherd or a collision alarm sounded before the accident. The Sea Shepherd should have been visible by radar or naked eye to the OOD for a considerable period of time prior to the accident despite the effects of the sun. The fact that the OOD was not able to identify the vessel until just before impact indicates poor watchstanding at a minimum, and it is likely that he fell asleep prior to the collision.
Probable Cause The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the collision between the Coast Guard cutter Key Largo and the fishing vessel Sea Shepherd was the failure of the cutter’s officer of the deck to detect and avoid the Sea Shepherd, most likely because he had fallen asleep prior to the accident. Contributing to the collision was the officer of the deck’s failure to report to the commanding officer his unfitness for duty due to lack of sleep.
The National Transportation Safety Board recommends US Coast Guard to address the risks associated with watchstander fatigue by implementing Commandant Instruction 3500.2, Crew Endurance Management, issued on March 30, 2006, in all operational units (M-16-004)
Further information on the incident may be found below
Source & Image credit: NTSB
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